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Trends in Electronic Commerce Security 
The Internet and similar networks provide new infrastructures for communications and 
commerce. These open networks interconnect computers across many different 
organizations with dramatically lower communications and distributed applications 
development costs. This motivates businesses to transfer commercial activity from closed 
private networks to open networks llke the Internet. 
However, open network architectures are vulnerable to a number of different security 
threats. While many different hardware and software solutions exist to secure transactions 
over the Internet, greater consensus is required by companies and consumers on the 
processes, organizations and application of existing technical solutions for secure 
electronic commerce. Greater consensus on security among trading parties will lower the 
costs of electronic commerce and accelerate its deployment on the Internet. 
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1.0 Trends in Electronic Commerce Security 
Widespread electronic commerce over the Internet will have a dramatic impact on the 
organization and execution of financial and non-financial transactions. As discussed in our 
previous report, electronic transactions promise to reduce transaction costs substantially. 
This will alter industry structure and competition by increasing price competition and 
reducing the margins of firms that cannot execute transactions in an efficient manner. 
Many large vendors (Microsoft, IBM, AT&T, MCI, EDS) now embrace the Internet as 
the infrastructure to support electronic commerce applications. However, the consumer's 
and business's trust in the security of the Internet will be a key factor in the rate of 
adoption and electronic commerce over the Internet. 
The Internet is inherently insecure for transactions as it can be compromised at several 
points, including the user's computer, the merchant's or service provider's system or at 
any intermediate point between them on the network. This is because the Internet 
consists of many different computer networks that are all interconnected using a common 
protocol. Due to this open network architecture, messages traverse many different 
networks between source and destination. For example, when a user transmits a credit 
card number over the Internet to a merchant, this number passes through several 
computer systems, including systems of other network users before reaching the 
merchant's computer. The integrity of the message codd be compromised at any of the 
intermediate points. Furthermore, as business on the Internet grows, it will become more 
difficult for both the buyer and the merchant to know whether each is legitimate. 
A number of methods are available to secure transactions on the Internet. This report 
identifies the requirements for secure electronic commerce and the major technical 
solutions available for securing transactions on the Internet. We propose that the technical 
schemes to secure transactions are well known and widely available. However, companies 
and industry groups lack any consensus on how to best implement security measures. As 
these measures are widely adopted, more business-to- business and consumer-to-business 
transactions will be carried out over the Internet. A variety of different payment and 
settlement schemes will evolve to support these transactions. These methods will vary in 
supporting features such as anonymity and transaction costs, for different types of 
transactions. Eventually consumer transactions will most likely be supported by smart 
cards due to their superior security and information storage features. 
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2.0 Creating Trust: Requirements for Secure Electronic Commerce 
All traditional commercial activities use procedures or occur within contexts designed to 
generate trust between individuals or between businesses. These trust mechanisms reduce 
the commercial risks faced by traders and rely on a variety of factors from prior track 
records, reputations, and the legal context for an exchange. However, unlike discrete face- 
to-face transactions where some good is exchanged for cash, electronic commerce creates 
both opportunities and difficulties for potential traders. Specifically, it opens the 
opportunity to expand trade at lower costs over a wider marketplace distributed over a 
larger geographic scope. Indeed leveraging these new opportunities over an inexpensive 
global communications infrastructure will be one of the key benefits of electronic 
commerce. 
Open networks like the Internet pose the new requirement of generating trust in an 
electronic environment. The essential requirements for carrying out secure electronic 
commerce based on models of traditional commerce model include the need for the 
following: 
*Server security 
Message Privacy 
Message Integrity 
*Authentication 
Authorization 
* Audit Mechanisms and Non-Repudiation 
*Payments and Settlements. 
Each of these requirements is defined and discussed below: 
2.1 Server Security: Viruses, Trojan Horses and Hackers 
Internet commerce requires secure server computers, computers that serve documents, 
files or programs to users. Server computers with critical applications should not be 
vulnerable to attack fkom software viruses or Trojan horses (viruses that are hidden 
program or documents to be activated at a later time), and unauthorized access over the 
network from hackers. The primary means to accomplish this is through firewalls and 
proxy machines that intermediate the relationship between a company's internal 
networks and the external Internet. Proxy and firewall servers intermediate all Internet 
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communications between a firm and its external environment. Every packet and or file 
transferred to or from the Internet to a firm's internal machine goes through the proxy or 
firewall server where it is checked to ensure there are no known viruses or other 
problems. Such firewall or proxy server software is widely available from many 
companies although not all organizations adopt this level of security. 
2.2 Message Privacy 
Message privacy is a key requirement for electronic commerce. Message privacy assures 
that communications between trading parties are not revealed to others as the message 
traverses an open network. 
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2.3 Message Integrity 
Message integrity is another key requirement for electronic commerce. It is important that 
the communications between trading parties are not altered as they traverse an open 
network. 
2.4 Authentication 
Authentication procedures generate trust by ensuring that the counterpart to an 
electronic transaction (who may be located elsewhere) is the person he or she claims to be 
online. As it is easy to "spoof' machine addresses or electronic mail addresses, methods 
of authentication are vital for secure transactions and their enforcement. 
2.5 Authorization 
Authorization ensures that a party to an electronic transaction has the authority to make 
a transaction, or is authorized to access specific information or computer resources. 
Authorization is important in managing the risk that employees or others do not make 
transactions that create economic damage or access key information or computational 
-- 
resources of the organization. 
2.6 Audit Mechanisms and Non repudiation 
Llke normal commercial transactions, audit mechanisms for electronic commerce enable 
the exchange parties to maintain and revisit a history or the sequence of events during a 
prior transaction. In electronic commerce, these audit trails could include time stamps or 
records by different computers at different stages of a transaction. In addition, there need 
to be confirmations and acknowledgments by the various transacting parties that they 
have accurately received various messages, and made specific commitments. Parties 
should not be able to repudiate their prior commitments. 
2.7 Payments and Settlements 
Electronic payment and settlements systems lower transaction costs for trading parties. 
Secure payment and settlement systems, that also ensure that the commitments to pay 
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for a good or service over electronic media are met. They are vital for widespread 
electronic commerce. 
There are a number of ways to meet the above requirements for secure electronic 
commerce. Other than server security, all the different mechanisms rely on some form of 
encryption. Below we outline the basics of encryption and discuss the different ways in 
which firms can apply available encryption techniques to meet the requirements to secure 
transactions over the Internet. 
3.0 Securing; Internet Commerce 
3.1 Encryption 
Encryption of comiimnications has traditionally been used to ensure the confidentiality of 
information. In electronic communications, encryption is the transformation of electronic 
information based on a secret key code. This transformation makes it difficult for 
unauthorized users to access or review the information. 
There are two basic forms of encryption, symmetric and asymmetric. The DES, or Data 
Encryption Standard, is a United States' Government standard for symmetric encryption 
of large blocks of data. This scheme encrypts or transforms the data being sent over a 
network using a secret encryption key in such a way that the message can be decrypted at 
the other end only by using the same secret key used initially to encode the message. 
Symmetric cryptography is difficult to break computationally. However, it is unsuitable 
for use by itself for encrypting transactions in the Internet. This is because both the 
sender and receiver must have knowledge of the same secret encryption key. For efficient 
electronic commerce, this would require transmission of the secret key over the open 
Internet network. As the transmission of keys can be intercepted, syrnmetric key 
encryption cannot be used by itself. Symmetric key encryption is also difficult to scale 
up to a large number of users. Each user would need to maintain a different key for every 
other user or merchant with whom they transact or exchange messages. 
Asymmetric cryptography, also referred to as public key cryptography, addresses the 
major limitations of the symmetric cryptographic schemes. It permits does not require the 
secure initial transmission of a code key (which is the case for symmetric cryptography) 
and it is scalable to a large number of users, Thus, it is well suited for use over the 
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Internet. For example, in the R S A ~  public key cryptography scheme, the encryption and 
decryption of data are performed using key pairs. Both the sender and receiver of a 
message each own a unique key pair. One key within the pair is called thepublic key. 
This public key is published widely. The other key in the key pair is called the private 
key and it is kept private to the party owning the key pair. The private key is never 
transmitted over the network. 
To send a secure and signed message from a sender to receiver, the sender encrypts the 
message using the receiver'spublic key and digitally signs the message using hisher 
(sender's) private key. On the other end of the communication the receiver decrypts the 
message using hisherprivate key and verifies the digital signature by using the sender's 
public key. This example illustrates a powerful property of the RSA asymmetric key 
encryption. Given a key pair, if the message is encrypted by it public key, it can be 
decrypted by the corresponding private key in the key pair and vice versa. By taking 
advantage of this property, communicating parties only have to reveal their public keys 
to enable secure encrypted communications as illustrated in the example above. 
The advantage of asymmetric cryptography is that secrecy is not needed for the public 
key. This means that only a single key pair needs to generated for each user or service 
provider. It also simplifies the distribution and management of the keys. The disadvantage 
-- 
of using this scheme over symmetric cryptography is its computational requirements and 
speed of decrypting messages. Asymmetric key encryption and decryption require more 
computational power and hence the performance of these systems are much slower than 
their symmetric counterparts. 
Thus, asynmetric cryptography is rarely used in isolation due to the performance issues. 
Instead it is used in combination with symmetric schemes. This kind of hybrid 
implementation is seen in several commercial Internet applications. Asymmetric 
cryptography is used to encrypt a symmetric encryption key and a checksum* which is 
then shared securely between a sender and receiver. Next the sender and receiver use the 
symmetric encryption key and checksum to encrypt and protect the actual message that 
is transmitted. This technique is popular in systems used to protect electronic mail, 
'RSA is a public key cryptography system developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (hence RSA) in 
1977. This is a patented system that held up well against various techniques to break the system. 
A checksum is a number generated at the time the message is sent which describes various properties of 
the message, such as the number of characters or specific types of characters in a message. It is used by the 
receiver to ensure that the message was not altered during transmission. 
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including Privacy Enhanced Mail(PEM), and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and in secure 
versions of protocols for the World Wide Web including the Secure HTTP (SHTTP) and 
the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols. 
The application of the above encryption techniques to solving different security problems 
is discussed in the next section. Today, Public Key Partners a Sunnyvale, California 
company owns the key patents to the RSA asymmetric key technologies. Software and 
technologies incorporating this de facto standard are distributed worldwide by RSA 
Security Inc., which provides licenses and key software to generate keys and to decode 
and encode messages to other vendors. 
3.2 Trends in Internet Security Protocols for Privacy and Message Integrity 
In a distributed communications system such as the Internet, developers of applications 
can choose to implement security protocols at many different levels within the seven 
layer Open Systems Interconnect reference model for distributed communications 
architectures. This model is illustrated below for reference: 
Figure 1 : The OSI-Reference and TCPIIP Models 
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In any distributed communications applications, each of the protocol levels below the 
applications level are applied to the data in order for it to be formatted, transmitted, and 
recovered after transmission across the network. 
1 
Three particular levels at which secure protocols exist, or are being developed and 
implemented, are the applications, session and network levels. Using security protocols 
at each of these different levels imposes different costs on developers of applications that 
run on the Internet. 
Network Level Security: Network level security is important because as packets of data 
traverse the network, their source and destination addresses are accessible to all 
intermediate network nodes or routers. Proposals for IPnG (the next generation of the 
Internet addressing scheme) will implement the encryption of key elements of packet 
header information to ensure that the privacy of key address information is maintained. In 
additian, these changes will reduce the likelihood of the success of "spoof~ng" or making a 
specific computer on the network appear as if it were another. IPnG will require a 
substantial upgrade in the software and capabilities of routers that currently switch traffic 
over the Internet. These changes do not protect the message. But they provide additional 
security for information about the source and destination of the message. 
Physical 
Session Layer Security: Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), a protocol devised by Netscape 
Communications, integrates security services at the session layer for applications that use 
a socket (TCP style) transport interface. SSL is designed to fit between application 
protocols, such as the hypertext transfer protocol CJVW service), file transfer protocol 
and telnet protocols and transport layer protocols such as TCP. It provides an encrypted 
and integrity-protected layer over which higher level protocols may be transmitted. SSL's 
role in a client-server connection is to encrypt outbound and decrypt inbound packets of 
a protocol specific datastream. Encryption keys are randomly generated during the 
session. For U.S. users, key sizes d l 1  be upto 128 bits long; and non-U.S users will have 
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Specifies protocols for 
transmission of data over physical 
media 
Physical 
keys sizes of 40 bits. The larger the key size the more difficult it is to compromise the 
security of the encryption. 
The advantage of SSL is that application developers on the World Wide Web ( W W )  do 
not have to wony about writing code to ensure message integrity and privacy of 
information transferred between users using client-server applications adopting SSL. Thus 
web developers can develop applications without worrying about the details of 
encryption. If, for example, a form is implemented on WlVW page to accept credit card 
numbers, users can be assured that the credit card number will not be decrypted while the 
information is traversing the Internet. It is important to note that SSL does not protect 
the integrity of the documents which are stored on a server. This would still require 
server security such as firewalls. To ensure documents stored on servers are not changed 
they should be digitally signed by the author. SSL also does not provide authentication of 
sites, or electronic counter parties. 
Applications Layer Implementations: 
Applications layer implementation of security implements encryption within a 
specialized software application or in separate applications dedicated to security. A 
number of tools exist to provide encryption to insure message privacy and integrity. 
-- These include: 
*Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), is a scheme devised by Philip Zirnmerman, that 
creates a random session key for a message, and uses the relatively inexpensive 
IDEA algorithm (symmetric cryptography) to encrypt the message. The RSA 
algorithm (asymmetric cryptography) is used to encrypt the session key with 
recipient's public key to exchange the session key securely over an open 
network. Then the encrypted message and the encrypted session key are then 
bundled together for transmission. This is an inexpensive and popular way of 
encrypting electronic mail. 
Privacy Enhanced Mail (RIPEM) is a scheme devised by Mark Riordian to 
sign documents or data, and to encrypt and decrypt them. It uses RSA 
algorithms and is supported by popular mail packages -- for example Gnu 
Emacs and ELM. RIPEM creates a digital signature on the document that is 
based on the message as well as private key of the sender. The public key of the 
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sender can then be used to authenticate the originator of a message and the digital 
signature can be used to verify the message has not been tampered with during 
transit. Thus, RIPEM can ensure message integrity as well as privacy. If the 
privacy of the message is less important, only the signature is sent as an 
encrypted message. 
*Secure HTTPD is a security protocol supported by a consortium of NCSA, 
EIT and RSA labs. In this implementation, security for transactions on the Web 
is provided at the application layer. SHTTPD allows a web browser to request a 
digital signature for a retrieved document. The digital signature is a checksum of 
the document encrypted using the private key of the document's author. The 
checksum can be decrypted with the public key of the author and the integrity 
of the document verified. Links to documents under SHTTPD identify the 
author of the document whose public key must be used to verify the signature. 
Similar to SSL, the SHTTPD scheme allows protected transmission of data in 
WWW forms sent by the user to the server. This is accomplished by encrypting 
the data stream using a code key that is sent to the HTTP Web Server, using 
HTTP server's public key to encrypt the code key during transmission. The 
primary use of this feature is to allow users to safely provide servers with 
passwords or credit card numbers. 
*Applications specific implementations of security: A number of companies are 
developing specialized applications that leverage the Internet's low cost 
infi-astructure for communications. For example, Premenos is a leading supplier 
of Electronic Data Interchange software for business to business 
communications. Premenos's TEMPLAR product line implements RSA based 
encryption of ED1 messages in its own software so that it does not have to rely 
on encryption provided by other vendors at lower layers of the seven layer 
reference model. Depending on the security requirements of specific contexts, 
more specialized applications are likely to implement security at the 
applications layer. In addition to ensuring message privacy and integrity, 
specialized applications at this layer will also support authentication, 
authorization and other desired feature for electronic commerce discussed in the 
next section. 
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Due to computational requirements, asymmetric cryptography is not typically used to 
encrypt messages in transaction processing applications. The asymmetric cryptography 
algorithms are not efficient at handling many thousands of operations per second on 
behalf on different clients. The scheme is best for store and forward applications like 
electronic mail and \NWW document transfer. 
Given the dominance of Netscape in browser markets SSL is likely to become a key 
standard, but developers will complement the capabilities of SSL with higher level 
security implemented at the application layer. IPnG is unlikely to be widely implemented 
in the next two years. 
3.3 Authentication and Authorization of Electronic Counter Parties on the 
Internet 
While cryptography can assure message integrity and privacy, it does not by itself assure 
that an electronic counterpart to a trade is authentic or authorized to make the trade. 
Given that asymmetric cryptography is the most appropriate for open networks, 
transacting parties must know the other party's public key or rely on a trusted third 
party to certify the other user's public key is valid. Without a trusted third party, it is 
possible for an attacker to replace the public key of a participant with a different key (for 
which the corresponding private key is known by the attacker). This allows the attacker 
to decrypt messages using the fake key and generate messages signed by the fake public- 
private key pair. 
Similarly, when using purely symmetric cryptography, a trusted third party intermediary 
with whom both parties share an encryption key can generate and distribute a new key, 
called a session key, to be used between parties that do not share a key directly. The use 
of such third parties for the exchange and certification of encryption keys is closely tied 
to authentication which binds the encryption keys to specific individuals, groups or 
organizations. 
Authentication and authorization of end users is enabled by two main mechanisms in a 
distributed computing environment. These include: the use of certificate authorities to 
bind specific parties to public key, and the use of Kerberos type systems to authenticate 
user access to the computing environment. In addition, application-specific and smart 
card solutions are also feasible. These are discussed below: 
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Cet-tzf?cate Authorities and Hierarchies: 
Certificate authorities (CA) provide a mechanism to bind a public key to an individual, 
group or organization. This is critical in implementing an authentication or authorization 
system. The following steps illustrate how a certification authority works to authenticate 
an end user. 
i) The CA will widely publish its public key so that its available to all users. 
ii) The CA, as a trusted third party, will verify that a specific person, or 
institution is bound to a specific public key. The public keys of different 
persons or institutions will be stored by the CA on a secure computer system. 
The verification of the identity of a user can depend on traditional paper 
documents or other direct authentication mechanisms. 
iii) If two parties now want to trade electronically, they can send a request to 
the CA for the other party's public key. This request can be sent using the 
CA's widely published public key to encrypt the request. As the CA holds its 
private key, it can review the request. The request can also include the 
requester's public key. 
iv) The CA can then send the public key of the counterparty to the requester. 
This message is encrypted by both the CA's private key and the requester's 
public key. 
v) The requester then decrypts the message from the CA, using his private key 
to ensure the message was not tampered with in transit. 
vi) The requester then decrypts the message further, using the CA's public key 
to verify that the message came from the CA. This reveals the true public key of 
the counterparty. 
vii) As the counterparty was previously authenticated by the CA, the requester 
of the public key can be assured that this is the true public key of the 
counterparty and that the counterparty is authentic. 
Once a certificate authority is established, a certificate hierarchy can be implemented to 
fiirther verify users, as well as provide a degree of authorization for transactions. 
Certificate hierarchies (CH) establish a "chain of trust". 
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While the technology for certification authorities is widely available, their widespread 
adoption is hampered by the lack of organizational and legal consensus in different 
industries on how to implement policies for certification and any attendant legal liability. 
Various industry trade groups in the United States are investigating ways of implementing 
CA to meet the needs of their industry. The secure implementation of the signed 
authorization certificates depends on the integrity and the authentication services. Thus, 
organizations will have to build substantial safeguards to assure the CA system is not 
compromised. 
Kerberos 
Authorization is required to establish what services on a host system, a remote user can 
access. For example, a salesperson needs to access his company's host computer over the 
Internet. How can this be done in a secure manner? 
The Kerberos system is an authentication protocol that can be embedded in any network 
protocol to identify the user making a request accurately. On the Internet, password 
based authentication is not suitable, as these passwords can be intercepted when they are 
sent across networks. An authentication protocol is required to prove the user has 
knowledge of the correct password without actually sending the password across the 
network. This can be accomplished by using an encryption key in place of a password 
and proving the knowledge of the encryption key. 
The Kerberos authentication protocol, developed at MIT in 1985, is based on symmetric 
cryptography. In this implementation, when the salesperson wishes to communicate with 
his company's host on the Internet, the Kerberos authentication server is contacted by 
sending the username, the server name and any additional information. Next, the Kerberos 
server randomly generates a session key and returns it to the requesting user, encrypting 
the key in some information derived from the user's password which was previously 
registered in advance with the host server. This encrypted session key is returned 
together with a ticket encrypted by the server that contains the name of the user and the 
session key. 
The encrypted session key and the ticket received from the Kerberos server is cached by 
the user system, reducing the number of requests to the server. To prove the authenticity 
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to the host, the salesperson enters his password to decrypt the session key. This 
password verification is now totally local to the client (salesperson's machine) side. Next, 
he or she forwards the ticket along with a timestamp encrypted in the session key from 
the ticket. The host system decrypts the ticket and uses the session key within it to 
decrypt the timestamp. If the timestamp is recent, the server knows that the message 
was sent by someone who knew the session key. Since the session key was only issued 
to the user named in the ticket, this authenticates the client. If the client requires 
authentication from the server, the server extracts the timestamp, re-encrypts it using the 
session key and returns it to the client. 
Thus, the Kerberos server acts as a trusted intermediary in the authentication process. 
Both the users, merchants or service providers using Kerberos have to register their 
encryption keys (passwords) in advance with the Kerberos server itself, and not with 
each party with which they will comunicate. The issue of securing this server against 
attackers becomes important. The server generates a session key when needed and 
distributes it to the client, and places it in the ticket where it can be later recovered by the 
merchant or service provider. This session key can then be used directly by the client and 
the service provider for encrypted communication as described earlier. 
Application Specific Authorizations 
Besides the use of a certificate authority, firms may use proprietary applications which 
have various specialized levels of built in authorization capabilities. These are likely to be 
adopted by financial services firms for specialized transactions. 
Smart Cards 
Smart cards permit hardware-based authentication and encryption independent of the 
network or the computer device to which the card reader is attached. Smart cards can have 
both memory and a simple processor embedded in them, If a user wants to connect to the 
network and be authorized to access resources over the network, he or she could insert 
the card in the card reader (such as a PCMCIA) slot and enter a password. The card 
would interpret and authorize the user's password much like how PIN codes work for 
credit cards. However, in addition to authenticating the user, the cards contain the user's 
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encryption keys. Thus, the card can sign messages on behalf of the user without divulging 
the keys to the computer device to which it is connected. 
This network and device independence make smart cards very attractive for authenticating 
parties in electronic transactions. Today smart card readers remain about $200 making it 
expensive to use these devices widely. However as prices fall and the functionality of 
cards increases for other purposes, smart cards promise to be a preferred choice for 
authenticating users of electronic commerce. 
3.4 Establishing Audit Trails, and Non Repudiation 
Besides message integrity, privacy, user authentication, and user authorization, secure 
electronic commerce requirements include the ability to audit transactions, and non- 
repudiation of commitments, payments or settlements. 
As illustrated by the notion of a certificate authority and hierarchy, audit trails can be 
established by the certificates applied to messages during various stages of a transaction 
and the verification of digital signatures. Other key features that can be provided by third 
parties to transactions include timestamps and records of inter-organizational transactions 
for dispute resolution. Again, the standards for these audit mechanisms are most likely to 
-- 
evolve to meet the requirements of specific industries. 
True non-repudiation of messages, in terms of the origin and receipt and 
acknowledgement of messages, is also important for electronic commerce. This means a 
party to a transaction cannot deny he or she received a particular message or payment 
after the fact. 
The encryption and the digital signature mechanisms discussed previously can be used to 
send acknowledgments of data receipt and confirm data origination. These techniques are 
most likely to be built into specific applications for electronic commerce. 
3.5 Secure Payments and Settlement Systems 
Secure payrnent systems can be built on the techniques discussed in the prior sections of 
this report. A number of different products have been developed or are in development 
for secure payment over electronic networks. However, no dominant standard has yet 
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been established for consumer or business to business payments. Secure payment 
systems can be broadly classified into three categories: 
-electronic cash systems 
electronic check systems 
*card based systems 
Electronic Cash Systems 
Cash consists of a token that can be authenticated independently of the issuer. Electronic 
cash consists of electronic currency certificates which customers buy from a currency 
server, paying for the certificates through an account established with the currency server 
in advance or through other forms of payment. The merchants on receipt of these 
electronic certificates can deposit them in their accounts or spend it elsewhere. The 
principal advantage of electronic currency is its potential for anonymity. However, on the 
other end, there is a need to maintain audit trails to prevent double spending. Examples of 
the electronic cash models include: Digicash, NetCash, and Mondex. 
-- 
Electronic Check Systems 
These systems are also referred to as debit-credit systems. Checks are payment 
instruments whose validity requires reference to the issuer. Electronic versions of this 
model include First Virtual's current products. Other products in development include 
Netcheque, Carnegie Mellon University's NetBill and the Financial Services Technology 
Consortium's Electronic Check project. In this model customers maintain accounts on a 
payment server and authorize charges against those accounts. These implementations rely 
on the authentication and authorization services like those described earlier in this report. 
Electronic check systems can be designed for micro-payments less than a dollar and 
implemented at low transaction costs. 
Card-Based Systems 
Card payment systems use the existing credit or debit card payment infrastructure. Such 
schemes have many structural similarities to check models except that solutions are 
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constrained by that structure. A key feature of card payment systems is that every 
transaction carries insurance. 
Card systems include offerings by CyberCash, Mastercard, Visa and other firms. 
Mastercard and Visa will use the secure electronic transactions standard supported by 
Netscape. In the card systems model, the customer's credit card number is encrypted 
using asymmetric cryptography so that it can only be read by the merchant, or in some 
cases a third party payment processing service. This allows existing credit card customers 
to use the Internet and leverages the existing credit card infrastructure to carry out 
transactions. Users need not be registered with a third party or a service provider to carry 
out transactions. This mode of payment is however not suitable for carrying out micro- 
payments as required for information goods. The transaction costs involved in the clearing 
credit card payments through the existing financial infi-astructure remains high. 
The different secure payment systems currently available on the Internet illustrate the 
feasibility of secure electronic commerce. A variety of different payment and settlement 
schemes will evolve to support transactions on the Internet. These will vary based on the 
importance they place on different features such as anonymity, micro-payments, ease of 
use, transaction costs for different types of transactions. Thus, no one system is likely to 
be the dominant standard. 
-- 
4.0 Conclusions 
A variety of techniques based on public key encryption support secure transactions over 
open electronic networks. This discussion addressed the requirements for message 
privacy, integrity, user authentication, authorization and non-repudiation, It also 
identified three different types of payment and settlement systems available for electronic 
commerce. 
We expect widespread adoption of the technologies discussed in this report to enhance 
the use of the Internet for electronic comerce.  The critical constraint is not technology 
as much as consensus on appropriate standards for electronic commerce. Different 
industries and organizations need to evolve new standards for electronic commerce that 
best meet the requirements of their industry. 
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